The bunkers were protected by infantry in open rifle pits located to the front, sides, and rear of the fortified entrenchments. Some infantry would be concealed in foxholes, under trees, or even in hollowed-out logs, while others simply waited in the jungle where they were heavily camouflaged. Snipers in the tall coconut trees or in concealed terrain positions were a major menace in both the American and Australian zones along the Buna front. The Girua River served as an inter-Allied boundary, with the Australians to the west of it, slogging through jungle trails to assault Gona and Sanananda Point.
The Girua River is about 50 feet wide until it disappears in the swamps southeast of Buna Village. The river eventually reaches the ocean through several mouths between Buna and Sanananda Point.
Two other waterways were important in regard to the combat. This swamp is absolutely impenetrable with closely spaced trees up to feet tall. Two large coconut plantations were present. The first, Government Plantation, was about yards wide and situated between the mouth of Simemi Creek and Buna Mission.
Duropa Plantation was much larger and ran south from Cape Endaiadere in the east toward Strip Point to the west. To the southwest of Duropa Plantation was a large area overgrown with kunai grass, upon which was situated the Old Strip, a goal of the Allied advance.
Allied control of the airfield would deny the Japanese another chance to seize Port Moresby by land and become a base for the Fifth U. Air Force. As the crisis on the Kokoda Trail passed after the Australians reoccupied Kokoda Village without any opposition on November 2, MacArthur had to protect his newly acquired airfield at Kokoda and another at Dobodura, about three miles south of Ango.
The Japanese, on the other hand, insisted that Buna be held at all costs and that the Dobodura airfield, 10 miles south of Buna, be destroyed. The loss of Dobodura would hamper Allied reinforcements of Papua and weaken their capacity for air attacks. Tokyo reasoned that losing Buna would jeopardize future operations on New Guinea and the Japanese position on Rabaul.
To that end, the Japanese were resolved to defend the Buna front to the last man. The plan envisioned by MacArthur was for a general advance by the Australian 7th Division to commence on November 16, , driving the Japanese back along the Kokoda Trail while the U.
The dividing line between the Australian and U. However, the Japanese troops situated there were well protected against any attack from inland. Swamps and dense jungle channeled the Allied attackers down a handful of trails, where a Japanese machine gun in a reinforced pillbox could hold off a battalion. The Australians, with the Americans advancing along the northern New Guinea coast, would expend much blood attempting to wrest control of Buna from the Japanese.
After five grueling weeks, the battalion reached Soputa on November George C. Motor barges then ferried the th along the Papuan coast to Pongani, just over 20 miles from Buna.
There the troops constructed a landing field, which enabled the other two battalions of the th Regiment to be airlifted to this new site on November All told, approximately 15, infantrymen and supporting troops were ferried to the Buna area by Cs. Kenney turned the Fifth Air Force into a multidimensional unit that included troop transport and supply and aerial artillery for troops who lacked field artillery.
With innovations perfected by his B Mitchell and A Havoc medium bombers, the daytime interdiction of Japanese coastal shipping and reinforcements to their New Guinea garrisons was stepped up. In mid-November , Lt. Adachi was to operate under Lt. Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the Eighth Area Army.
Imamura was directly tasked by Prime Minister Hideki Tojo to first recapture Guadalcanal and to hold and consolidate at Buna. In the future another land assault would be planned against Port Moresby. Despite intensive Allied bomber interdiction of Japanese reinforcements and mountain guns from Rabaul, Adachi amassed 2, to 2, troops for the defense of the Buna area, including about 1, of whom had not participated in the overland attack on Port Moresby.
Some had just landed, while about infantrymen of the th Regiment had survived the retreat up the Kokoda Trail, which claimed the life of General Horii, who drowned in the fast-flowing Kumusi River trying to escape to Lae. The remainder of this regiment was in position near Inonda. The remainder of the 2nd Battalion established a division reserve at Ango. Without a harbor and with swamps and creeks protecting it on the inland side, Buna would have to be approached along four jungle trails, each approximately 12 feet wide, but always prone to becoming washed out by tropical downpours.
To that end the American engineers of the th Regiment were constantly laying down coconut log-surfaced corduroy roads to enable jeeps to bring up supplies and evacuate casualties. The American approach to Buna was confined to two routes——one between Simemi Creek and the east coast and the other on the west side of the swamp along the Ango trail toward Buna Mission and Buna Village. The two routes lacked lateral communication, requiring two days to march from one flank to the other.
More importantly, the Americans had little intelligence on the enemy opposition and location of defensive fortifications they would soon face. The Japanese had a motor road from Buna Mission to the bridge at Simemi Creek, which enabled lateral communication and reinforcement.
Yasuda had installed heavy barbed-wire entanglements along this area to thwart an advance from the south. The SNLF units were deployed in a honeycomb of bunkers on the main approach between the swamps and in the coconut grove and gardens behind. About yards southeast of Giropa Point, more entrenched positions were situated along the western end of the Old Strip, which had been built by Australian forces before the July Japanese invasion.
It had been used by Japanese naval aircraft in August but had been heavily bombed and put out of action with several disabled Zero fighters and transports left abandoned on the runway. This eastern Japanese flank, under the command of Colonel Shigemi Yamamoto, was defended by the 3rd Battalion, th Infantry Regiment, which had captured Canton and Hong Kong and, until mid-November, had been at Gona.
Miscellaneous units included a heavy antiaircraft battery of the 73rd Independent Unit, a mountain artillery battery of the 3rd Battalion, 55th Field Artillery Unit, and replacements for the th Infantry Regiment. During the initial two weeks of the Allied thrust on Buna, the American troops would face mostly fresh, fit, well-equipped Japanese troops. Advancing American infantry first had to learn how to locate the camouflaged enemy bunkers, with forward units often being mown down by Japanese machine-gun fire, and then making costly frontal or flank attacks, the latter by crawling through swampy terrain.
Sometimes advancing American infantrymen were allowed to pass the well-concealed Japanese positions before the defenders opened fire on the rear echelon of the patrol from all sides, inflicting heavy casualties. Take Buna today at all costs. Harding ordered a frontal assault that day along the Japanese easternmost positions after a preliminary bombing raid and mortar attack, since there was no American artillery present. Again, well-aimed Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire and snipers curtailed the American attack.
In addition, the Japanese would retreat during aerial bombardment to reinforced shelters and then sneak back to their pillboxes after the air raids to be ready at their machine guns once the Americans advanced. Also on November 21, the 2nd Battalion, th Regiment, which had made the grueling Kapa Kapa Trail march, was stopped by the enemy at The Triangle south of Government Gardens in the western sector.
The terrain there was mostly knee-deep swamp water that ruined radios, soaked mortar propellant, jammed machine guns and rifles with muck, and disoriented the GIs, especially in the darkness. Entrance Creek, west of The Triangle, was unfordable for a flanking maneuver, except at sites well covered by Japanese machine guns and barbed wire that prevented the Americans from getting close.
On November 22, the 2nd Battalion, th Regiment, which had been supporting the Australian 7th Division, was released by the Australians to support the 2nd Battalion, th Regiment, struggling in The Triangle and at Entrance Creek. General Harding formed two large task forces out of his surviving 3, combat troops; the 2nd Battalions of both the th and th Regiments would operate to the west of the large swamp area and were designated Urbana Force.
The smaller of the two forces, under the command of Colonel John Mott, was tasked with assaulting Buna Village and then advancing onto Buna Mission. East of the swamp, the larger force, dubbed Warren Force, was comprised of the 1st Battalion, th Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the th Infantry Regiment, along with some Australian elements, all under Brig.
Hanford MacNider. This constituted the last Allied troop movement prior to reinforcements arriving on the Buna front. On November 24, Urbana Force moved against The Triangle area and, after a day of crawling through the fetid swamp, reached a point beyond Entrance Creek adjacent to the trail to Buna Village to the northwest. The Triangle, a deep enemy salient of interlocking machine guns and mortars, could not be approached from the east, as both swamp and open kunai grass areas impeded advances.
Thus, any further movement of Urbana Force would have to be to the northwest of The Triangle in the direction of Buna Village. On November 26, the fighting shifted to the Warren Force area.
Elements of the 3rd Battalion, th Regiment and 1st Battalion, th Regiment attacked Japanese positions at Duropa Plantation after aerial and artillery bombardment, the latter from one American mm howitzer battery, six Australian pounders, and one mountain howitzer just airlifted to the front.
Target identification by Allied fighters and ammunition resupply was problematic, however. The preliminary aerial and gun bombardment had not destroyed the Japanese reinforced bunkers, so the infantry attack sputtered under heavy enemy machine-gun fire and no further attempts to reduce the defensive fortifications were made for 72 hours. A further hindrance to the Warren Force advance was the strafing by Japanese fighters from Lae. On November 30, a new offensive failed on the Urbana Force front west of Entrance Creek, while a two-battalion assault, without the planned Australian Bren gun carriers, faltered in the Duropa Plantation to the east.
Thus, the Japanese defensive line along the Buna front was undented and as strong as it had been almost two weeks earlier, after inflicting about American casualties. Richard K. A combination of inexperience and poor leadership, however, meant they made little progress against the well-sited and heavily fortified bunkers with which the Japanese defended it. By this time, Buna village had been captured but the Japanese remained well-entrenched around the airfields and the government station.
Despite the support of the tanks, the fighting was slow and vicious, with the Japanese bunkers having to be destroyed one by one. By 23rd December this phase of the operations had achieved its objective of clearing the area between the airfields and the coast, and it was now time to tackle the core of Japanese resistance - the positions around the western end of the old strip. The four tanks that initially accompanied the battalion were quickly destroyed, leaving the infantry to tackle the bunkers with only the most minimal artillery support.
When more tanks began arriving on 29 December another attack was rushed through, with the same disasterous results. They attacked on the morning of 1 January and, with the tanks and infantry co-operating closely, destroyed the bulk of the Japanese positions before nightfall. The destruction of isolated points of resistance continued the next day. Afterwards, their bodies were never recovered and were possibly thrown into the sea. Possibly, Captain Austin and Father Holland were also present in this group, or were killed elsewhere or earlier.
After the Japanese advance was hauled, Australian forces began advancing towards the north coast with the objective of capturing Buna. Meanwhile, Japanese forces worked to build extensive fortifications in the Buna area including coconut log bunkers, trenches and sniper positions.
By late , roughly 9, Japanese defended the area spanning from Buna to Gona. The Buna area was defended by approximately 2, troops including fresh reinforcements from the th Infantry Regiment and th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion under the command of Col.
Hiroshi Yamamoto. Army forces attacked Buna village on November 16, , but little gains were made. More reinforcements were sent forward and but only small gains were made. By December 14, the Japanese abandoned Buna village and were occupying positions to the east at nearby Jiropa.
Army 32nd Infantry Division. However, the left company, attacking without tanks lost more than half its eighty-seven men in an advance of only about yards and was pinned down. The attack did not resume until after the arrival of three tanks in the afternoon. The battalion lost officers and men, about half the strength of the attacking companies.
Two tanks were disabled on the battlefield.
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